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I. Introduction 
The year 1969 produced little in the way of legislation 
affecting administrative law, and the cases reviewing adminis-
trative action noted here are not necessarily included because 
they indicate anything new, but because they indicate some-
one did not understand what is old. 
The decisions of the Department of Motor Vehicles, in par-
ticular, have been the subject of most of the litigation during 
224 CAL LAW 1970 
2
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9
Administrative Law 
the past year. These cases present most clearly the struggle 
of the courts to evolve some unifying principles in the applica-
tion of the law to the driver who drinks. Not all the cases are 
in harmony, but trends seem to be developing. 
II. Driver's License-Implied Consent Law 
The avalanche of cases arising under the Implied Consent 
Law1 continues unabated. This law requires the Department 
of Motor Vehicles to suspend for six months the driving privi-
leges (1) of a person who is arrested2 for any offense com-
mitted while driving on a public highway while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor, (2) where a peace officer has 
reasonable cause to believe that such person has been driving 
on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, (3) where the individual has been advised that the fail-
ure to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic 
content of his blood will result in the suspension of his driving 
privileges and (4) where he refuses to submit to the test. 
Under the statute, the person has the right to choose whether 
the test will be of his blood, breath, or urine, and, by specific 
amendment enacted in 1969, he has the right to be told that 
he has this choice.3 
The results of chemical tests give rise to presumptions re-
lating to the intoxication of the driver.4 
It has been determined that a driver who, under the above 
circumstances, has been requested to submit to a chemical 
test, has no right to the presence of counsel at the time of the 
request or at the time of the administration of the test. s A 
problem has arisen, however, in cases where the driver has 
been given the so-called Miranda warning before he is request-
1. Vehicle Code § 13353. 
2. An arrest for drunk driving of a 
person involved in a traffic accident 
may be made without a warrant upon 
reasonable cause. Vehicle Code 
§ 40300.5. added Stats. 1969, Ch. 956. 
3. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1439. 
CAL LAW 1970 
4. Vehicle Code § 23126, added 
Stats. 1969, Ch. 231. 
5. Ent v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles, 265 Cal. App.2d 936, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. 726 (1968); Wegner v. Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles, 271 Cal. App. 
2d 838. 76 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969). 
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ed to submit to the chemical test.6 In some of the cases, the 
driver claimed that he was confused by the Miranda warning 
and that where he, because of the confusion, refused to sub-
mit to the test until his attorney arrived or he consulted with 
him, he should not be held to have refused. Where a person 
is given the Miranda warning and then is requested to do 
something by the police, if what he is asked to do is quite 
similar to what he is told he has a right not to do under the 
Miranda warning, his failure to do what the police have asked 
him to do may be the result of confusion, and should not be 
used against him.7 In the cases of Finley v. Orr8 and Fallis v. 
Department of M afar Vehicles, 9 the courts were so impressed 
by the fact that each driver had engaged in conversation and 
responded in an uninhibited fashion to the warning, that his 
later contention that the Miranda warning had confused him 
seemed unreal. 
In Reirdon v. Director, Department of Motor Vehicles/o 
the policeman who made the demand that the driver submit 
to the chemical test not only gave the Miranda warning, but 
fully explained to the petitioner that he had the right to counsel 
only in connection with the criminal charge of driving a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and 
further told him that he did not have the right to have an attor-
ney present with him in the jail at the time the chemical test 
was being performed. Consequently, the Court determined 
that the petitioner was not justified in refusing to take the test 
until an attorney was present. He had been clearly and un-
equivocally told that he had no right to the presence of coun-
sel. Therefore, his contention of bewilderment was not at all 
persuasive. 
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
10 AL.R.3d 974 (1966). 
7. The court cited People v. Ellis, 
65 Cal.2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 421 
P.2d 393 (1966); see also Ent v. De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal. 
App.2d 936, 71 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1968). 
and Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 
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1969, pp. 329-330. 
8. 262 Cal. App.2d 656, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 137 (1968). 
9. 264 Cal. App.2d 373, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 595 (1968). 
10. 266 Cal. App.2d 808, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 614 (1968). 
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In Rust v. Department at Motor Vehicles,ll the Miranda 
warning had been given, and the driver refused to take the 
test until he talked to his attorney. The trial court held for 
the driver, and the reviewing Court affirmed the trial court. 
The trial court found that the driver had not unequivocally 
rejected the test in such a way as to excuse the peace officer 
from supplying further information. Consequently, the re-
viewing Court determined that where the officer introduced 
the question of the right to counsel, and it became evident 
that the driver thought he was entitled to an attorney and may 
have misconceived the warning, the officer should have elab-
orated by stating that the warning was inapplicable to the 
blood-alcohol test. The Court cited Reirdon as an example 
of a situation where the proper instruction had been given. 
Strangely, the Court relied upon People v. Ellis/2 although a 
careful reading of Ellis will indicate that there could be no 
possible confusion between the right to remain silent and the 
right to counsel, and the duty to submit to a test. Neverthe-
less, Ellis is cited as the genesis for this result. 
'In Kingston v. Department at Motor Vehicles/3 the Court 
determined that where the Miranda warning was given and the 
driver stated that he wanted to see his attorney, it was con-
ceivable that the driver, as in Rust, could have misinterpreted 
the Miranda warning. If so, he was entitled to a further 
elaboration by the peace officer before his request to see his 
attorney was treated as an outright refusal to take the test. 
The driver was entitled to a hearing to determine whether he 
had so misinterpreted the Miranda warning. 
In Weber v. Orr,l4 the Rust issue was not raised before 
either the Department or the Superior Court; it was raised for 
the first time before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Ap-
peal, following the lead in Wethern v. Orr/6 held that where 
the Miranda warning was given and the driver demanded 
11. 267 Cal. App.2d 545, 73 Cal. 14. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 366 (1968). Rptr. 297 (1969). 
12. 65 Cal.2d 529, 539, 55 Cal. Rptr. 15. 271 Cal. App.2d 813, 76 Cal. 
385, 390, 421 P.2d 393, 398 (1966). Rptr. 807 (1969). 
13. 271 Cal. App.2d 549, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 614 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 227 
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counsel, the driver could not be required to take the test in 
the absence of a further explanation that his constitutional 
rights did not apply to the decision to submit or not to submit 
to a test under Vehicle Code section 13353. 
Wethern and Weber, then, treated as a matter of law the 
fact that confusion can exist under these circumstances. 
The trial court in Walker v. Department of Motor Vehicles16 
denied the relief sought by the driver. The reviewing Court 
was faced with the Rust issue, and found that the Superior 
Court had considered whether the appellant was confused 
and misled by the Miranda warning, and had determined that 
there was no such confusion. The Court said: 
There is no basis for the contention that the juxtaposi-
tion of the Miranda warning and the statutory demand 
for a test vitiate the latter as a matter of law. The state-
ment of the officer that 'you are entitled to an attorney 
throughout the entire interview' is not literally incon-
sistent with the requirement that he take a blood, breath 
or urine test without waiting for his attorney. Although 
the Rust opinion advises the officers to tell the arrestee 
that the right to counsel does not apply to the chemical 
test, it does not create a new un statutory condition pre-
cedent to the application of section 13353 [The Implied 
Consent Law V7 
The Court seems to take issue with Wethern, and states: 
If Wethern is read as holding that, as a matter of law, 
the Miranda warning excuses the driver's refusal to take 
the chemical test, it is inconsistent with the [holding] 
in Kingston. In [that] case the appellate court refrained 
from deciding that the driver was excused as a matter of 
law, and sent the case back for trial on the issue of facets 
The reviewing Court in Pepin v. Department of Motor Ve-
hicles19 announced that the driver was not entitled to consult 
16. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 18. 274 Cal. App.2d -, -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 433 (1969). Rptr. 433, 438 (1969). 
17. 274 Cal. App.2d -, -, 79 Cal. 19. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 433, 437 (1969). Rptr. 657 (1969). 
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his attorney before taking the test, and his insistence upon 
consulting his attorney before taking it supported the finding 
that he refused. The Court stated that substantial evidence 
supported the implied finding that the driver was not misled 
by an earlier Miranda warning. Apparently, the driver hurt 
himself when he testified: 
You hear so much scuttle-butt . . . about the effects 
of all those tests . . . so I just didn't know which one 
to take. . that's why I wanted the advice of an 
attorney. 
The trial court, it was reasoned, could conclude that the 
confusion was independently arrived at and was not the result 
of the statements by the arresting officer. 
In West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 20 the Court 
reversed the judgment of the trial court on the Rust issue. 
The Court of Appeal determined that where the arrested per-
son is confused and where his response to questions asked 
him concerning his willingness to take the test indicates that 
he is asserting a right that he has been told he has as the result 
of the Miranda warning, it is incumbent on the officer to 
make an explanation. West is interesting because on Septem-
ber 26, 1969, the court modified its opinion to indicate that 
the confusion of the driver should have been apparent to the 
arresting officer. The court stated originally: 
Thus, it is necessary to send the case back to the trial 
court to make a finding as to whether or not the record 
does, in fact, show confusion on the part of the respond-
ent. I 
This sentence was modified as the result of the order of 
September 26, 1969, to provide an addition, so that the sen-
tence now reads: 
Thus, it is necessary to send the case back to the trial 
court to make a finding as to whether or not the record 
20. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 385 (1969); modified 1 Cal. App. 
3d 1049a. 
CAL LAW 1970 
1. 275 Cal. App.2d -, -, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 385, 387; modified 1 Cal. App. 
3d 1049a. 
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does, in fact, show confusion on the part of the respond-
ent which should have been apparent to the arresting of-
ficers. (Emphasis added.)2 
In Lacy v. Orr,3 the peace officer told the driver he had a 
right to the presence of a lawyer while being questioned, and 
subsequently advised the driver of the requirements of the 
Implied Consent Law. The driver said he wanted a lawyer 
before submitting to the test. The reviewing Court affirmed 
the trial court's judgment denying to the driver a writ of man-
date. The reviewing Court distinguished Rust, saying that 
the Miranda warning in Rust stated the driver had a right 
"beginning at that moment, to an attorney." In addition, 
the driver's testimony never indicated he had been confused. 
The 1969 cases show that the courts have treated this duty 
on the part of the officer to be either absolute, as in Wethern 
and Weber, or dependent on the facts, as in Walker, so that if 
the trial court determined there was no confusion, the review-
ing Courts generally will affirm. The trend of the cases in-
dicates that confusion is not established simply because the 
driver refuses to take the test until he talks to his attorney.4 
Perhaps, at some time, the State Supreme Court will clarify 
this disarray of judicial opinion, and will restore People v. 
Ellis to the authoritative position it once held. 
The courts have indicated that there is no duty on an officer 
to explain to a driver that he has no right to have his own 
physician withdraw blood when the test is given. This point 
was made clear in Beales v. Department of Motor Vehicles. 5 
It was there held that the driver's twice-pronounced statement 
that "he would take a blood test on the condition his own phy-
sician be permitted to draw the blood" was a refusal within 
the contemplation of section 13353 of the Vehicle Code. In 
Wegner v. Department of Motor Vehicles,6 the Court reversed 
2. Modified 1 Cal. App.3d 1049a. S. 271 Cal. App.2d 622, 76 Cal. 
3. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. Rptr. Rptr. 662 (1969). 
276 (1969). 6. 271 Cal. App.2d 838, 76 Cal. 
4. See also Ent v. Department of Rptr. 920 (1969). 
Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal. App.2d 936, 
71 Cal Rptr. 726 (1968). 
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a finding by the trial court that there was no refusal. The 
driver refused to take the test, stating that he wanted the test 
to be given by his own doctor. The Court ruled that the driver 
was neither entitled to have his lawyer present, nor entitled 
to have his own doctor perform the test. The driver, at the 
hearing, maintained that the only reason he wanted his own 
doctor was because the technician summoned to take the blood 
test had dirty fingernails, and he feared infection. The Court, 
on appeal, took the position that if there had been objection 
to the dirty fingernails of the technician, this should have been 
indicated to the peace officer at the time the technician was 
summoned. It would have been a simple matter for the driver 
to indicate to the technician that his fingernails were dirty. 
A related situation arose in Westmoreland v. Chapman,7 
where the driver refused to let a technician draw a blood 
sample simply because the driver did not like a technician per-
forming this test. The court held that this was a refusal, and 
indicated that the driver need not be told that the licensed 
technician was authorized by statute to take the blood test. 
Where the driver wishes to have his own doctor perform the 
blood test, the Vehicle Codes indicates that he may do so, 
but that such a test is an additional test. The right to have his 
own doctor perform the test is not a right that he can assert 
under Vehicle Code section 13353, and whatever other rights 
he may have under the Vehicle Code need not be explained 
to him in order to make a refusal under section 13353 effec-
tive. 
On the other hand, where a driver indicates that he is 
willing to take anyone of the tests, and his responses indicate 
that he wants the peace officer to make the election, there is 
no refusal. The Court so held in James v. State of California 
ex reI. Department of Motor Vehicles.9 Among other reasons 
given for the Court's conclusion that there was no refusal was 
the fact that the statute placed no affirmative duty on the 
driver to state which test he would take. This statement is 
7. 268 Cal. App.2d 1, 74 Cal. Rptr. 9. 267 Cal. App.2d 750, 73 Cal. 
363 (1968). Rptr. 452 (1968). 
8. Vehicle Code § 13354. 
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remarkable in that the statute does contemplate that the driver 
be given his choice of which test he wishes to take, and the 
1969 amendment to section 13353 makes it very clear that 
the driver shall be told that he has his choice. It would seem 
that if the choice were the driver's, and if he had the duty to 
take a test, one could well conclude that he had a duty to 
make an election. Whether the same results would obtain 
now, under the 1969 legislation, one may only speculate. 
Under existing law, the statute requires the driver to be told 
that the failure to submit to the test will result in the suspen-
sion of his license for six months. In lanusch v. Department 
of Motor Vehicles/a the driver was told that he would "prob-
ably" have his license suspended by the Department of Motor 
Vehicles. It was urged that the use of the word "probably" 
vitiated compliance with section 13353. The Court, observ-
ing that the uncontradicted evidence in the record showed 
that the officer signed the sworn statement indicating that the 
failure to submit to the test "will" result in the suspension of 
the driver's license privileges, noted that the only evidence 
relating to any defect in the warning concerned the use of the 
word "probably" by the officer. The Court observed that it 
would have been preferable if the exact words of the statute 
had been used, but noted that it was probable, but not positive, 
that the license would be suspended. Obviously, the use of 
the word "probably" did not confuse the driver, and, thus, its 
use did not vitiate the warning. 
In Lacy v. Orr/1 the Court was also faced with the con-
tention that the driver had been denied due process of law 
because he was not permitted to secure legal counsel after his 
arrest and, therefore, was prevented from extricating himself 
from the consequences of his refusal to submit to one of the 
tests. The Court, however, indicated that the fact that he was 
not permitted to call an attorney until after the booking proce-
dure had ended did not deprive him of any rights with regard 
to Vehicle Code section 13353; whatever wrong might have 
occurred in withholding permission to make telephone calls 
10. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. 11. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 726 (1968). Rptr. 276 (1968). 
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within the statutory period permitted by the Penal CodeI2 
was unrelated to the application of the section involved; that 
implied consent problems may be separated from the matters 
normally involved in arrest, detention, and acquiring of evi-
dence. I3 
In Wegner v. Department of Motor Vehicles,14 the driver, 
after refusing to take the test and upon his release from the 
police station, secured his own blood test and gave the results 
to the district attorney. The Court held that such an attempt 
did not overcome the effects of the refusal. Is 
The Court, in Fankhauser v. Orr/6 reversed the judgment 
of the trial court that had granted a writ of mandate predicated 
on the assertion that the driver was too drunk to have re-
fused. I7 In addition, Fankhauser determined the role the 
officer's sworn statement should play in informal proceedings 
held before the department pursuant to section 13353. 
Vehicle Code section 14104, relating to this type of informal 
hearing, admits evidence of this nature. IS 
In Noll v. Department of Motor Vehicles/9 the Court ex-
plained subdivision (c) of Vehicle Code section 13353, with 
respect to the effect of a request for a continuance by the 
driver. The Court pointed out that where a hearing was 
scheduled within 15 days of a request by the driver, any re-
12. Penal Code § 851.5. 
13. People v. Wren, 271 Cal. App. 
2d 788, 76 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1969); 
People v. Fite, 267 Cal. App.2d 685, 
73 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1968); People v. 
Hanggi, 265 Cal. App.2d Supp. 969, 
70 Cal. Rptr. 540, 73 Cal. Rptr. 666 
(1968). 
14. 271 Cal. App.2d 838, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 920 (1969). 
15. The results here were fairly well 
forecast in Zidell v. Bright, 264 Cal 
App.2d 867, 71 Cal. Rptr. III (1968). 
See also Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW, Cal Law-Trends and Develop-
ments 1969, pp. 333-334. 
16. 268 Cal. App.2d 418, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 61 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 
17. The court relied on Bush v. 
Bright, 264 Cal. App.2d 788, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. 123 (1968). 
18. In its analysis of the problem, 
the court did a far better job of ex-
plaining the admissibility of the sworn 
statement than did the court in Fallis 
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 
Cal. App.2d 373, 70 Cal. Rptr. 595 
(1968) and this is probably one of the 
better cases in explaining the force of 
that code section as well as Vehicle 
Code § 14108, relating to evidence to 
be considered by the department. 
19. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 236 (1969). 
233 
11
Manuel: Administrative Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Administrative Law 
quest for a hearing extending the time beyond the 15 days 
would cause any stay of the department's order of license 
suspension to be lifted. However, the section would not re-
quire the termination of the stay pending completion of a 
hearing that the department had to afford, when the delay is 
occasioned by the failure of the department's witness to pro-
duce documents that are material to his testimony. In Noll, 
the driver contended that the peace officer had a very poor 
memory, and if the officer had brought his documents, more 
would have been established on cross-examination. The 
Court noted that discovery was available to the driver and 
that if the reports of the policeman were so important, they 
should have been secured by the driver. Since he did not, 
their absence is unexplained, and the Court will assume that 
the report was wilfully suppressed. 
In Pepin v. Department of Motor Vehicles,20 the Court 
pointed out that there was no exception to the automatic 
suspension where driving was necessary in employment or 
earning a livelihood.1 
III. Procedure at Administrative Hearings 
A. Tn General 
During 1969, a number of cases were decided relating to 
( 1) jurisdiction of administrative agencies to hold hearings, 
(2) burden of proof, (3) application of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 2 (4) res judicata, and (5) quasi-legislative 
hearings. 
B. Jurisdiction of Administrative Agencies 
1. To Reach Former Employees 
In Cal-Pacific Collection, Inc. v. Powers,3 the California 
Supreme Court discussed the jurisdiction of the Department 
20. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 2. Govt. Code §§ 11500 et seq. 
Rptr. 657 (1969). 3. 70 Ca1.2d 135, 74 Cal. Rptr. 289, 
1. Vehicle Code § 13210 does not 449 P.2d 225 (1969). 
apply. 
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of Professional and Vocational Standards to proceed against 
a licensee of a Collection Agency Licensing Bureau, as well 
as the individual plaintiffs employed by the collection agency 
in various capacities. The question arose because of an at-
tempt by the licensing agency to institute and take disciplinary 
action against these individual employees and Cal-Pacific, 
although Cal-Pacific had surrendered its license prior to the 
time that disciplinary action had been instituted. During 
the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, the qualifica-
tion certificate issued to Cal-Pacific's secretary was revoked 
by operation of law for nonpayment of fees. Cal-Pacific 
contended that the acceptance by the licensing agency of the 
voluntary surrender of the license deprived the agency of juris-
diction to proceed against it. The licensing agency in the 
proceeding relied upon Business and Professions Code section 
6949.1, stating in part: 
The voluntary surrender of a license . . . shall not 
deprive the Director of jurisdiction to proceed with 
any disciplinary proceeding against such li-
cense. . . . 
The Supreme Court had no difficulty in determining that 
pursuant to the plain reading of the language of the statute, 
the licensing agency was not deprived of jurisdiction by the 
voluntary surrender. Moreover, the power of the agency to 
take disciplinary action was not limited in any way to pro-
ceedings already pending at the time of the surrender by 
Cal-Pacific. The Court so held in the face of Cal-Pacific's 
contention that pursuant to section 6949 of the Business and 
Professions Code, under which it purportedly surrendered 
its license, such a surrender could be made only "so long 
as no disciplinary action is then pending against said licensee. 
. . ." As between these two sections, 6949 and 6949.1, the 
latter was held by the Court to rule; otherwise, its enactment 
would have been simply a useless gesture. 
With regard to the individual who held only a qualifica-
tion certificate, no section such as 6949.1 of the Business 
and Professions Code was applicable. The individual cer-
CAL LAW 1970 235 
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tificate-holders had to rely upon Business and Professions 
Code section 118, applicable to all statewide agencies within 
the Department of Professional and Vocational Standards, 
which provided in part in subdivision (b) : 
The . . . exception, or forfeiture by operation of 
law of the license issued by the board in the depart-
ment . . . shall not, during any period in which it 
may be renewed, restored, reissued or reinstated, deprive 
the board of its ability to institute or continue a dis-
ciplinary proceeding against a licensee upon any ground 
provided by law or to enter an order suspending or revok-
ing a license or otherwise taking disciplinary action 
against a licensee on any such ground. . . . 
The case also dealt with three employees of Cal-Pacific. 
They held no license or certificate, and had terminated their 
employment with Cal-Pacific prior to the institution of the 
disciplinary action seeking to disqualify them from holding 
any office or employment in the collection agency business. 
Section 6930 of the Business and Professions Code then in 
effect authorized the director, upon finding a violation by an 
"employee" of a licensee, to order the "employee" disqualified 
from further employment in the collection agency business. 
After the institution of the proceedings, the word "em-
ployee," as found in section 6930 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code, was changed to read "person." With the change, 
the Court noted that the director was authorized to institute 
proceedings of disqualification after the employee had termi-
nated his employment, but the Court was unable to find any 
statutory provisions that would have authorized such pro-
ceedings at the time the matter was instituted. As to the 
former employees at the time the action was instituted, the 
director had no jurisdiction to proceed to disqualifica-
tion. 
Cal-Pacific is one of the more recent cases in California 
dealing with the ability of the licensing agency to proceed 
against persons who at one time or another had been under 
the control of the agency and who, by one means or another, 
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attempt to remove themselves voluntarily from its con-
tro],4 
2. To Impose Conditions 
Related to the question of jurisdiction is the question of 
what happens when the agency attempts to extract from some-
one dealing with it a condition that is beyond the statutory 
authority of the administrative agency. 
In Worthington v. State Board of Control,5 an employee 
of the State Board of Control obtained a release from a claim-
ant seeking compensation under the provisions of Government 
Code sections 13970-13973, which compensate private 
citizens injured while preventing a crime. The release pur-
ported to extinguish all claims against the state relating to the 
subject matter of the claim. The Court considered the re-
lease totally ineffective. The program of indemnity under 
which the claimant sought benefits existed only by reason of 
the statute. The procedure was prescribed by the State Board 
of Control. Neither the statute nor the rules refer to any 
requirement of a release before payment could be made. 
When the legislature acted on the Board of Control's recom-
mendation calling for payment of a portion of the applicant's 
4. For agencies within the Depart-
ment of Professional and Vocational 
Standards, the reader should review 
the provisions of Business and Profes-
sions Code § 118. Where the agency 
is not within the Department of Pro-
fessional and Vocational Standards, 
and there is no other code section 
relating ot the effect of withdrawal of 
an application for licensure or an at-
tempted surrender of a license, the 
reader may find some enlightenment 
in cases such as Jones v. SEC, 298 
U.S. 1, 80 L.Ed. 1015, 56 S.C!. 654 
(1935) and Miller v. Board of Police 
Commissioners, 181 Cal. App.2d 562, 
5 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960), holding that 
a withdrawal of an application, absent 
a statute to the contrary, deprives the 
agency of jurisdiction to continue to 
CAL LAW 1970 
hear the case. On the other hand, 
once a license is issued, the licensee 
has submitted himself to the control 
of the agency, and an attempted sur-
render of the license, absent a statute 
to the contrary, will not deprive the 
agency of power to proceed with the 
hearing and make a decision. Albert 
Albek, Inc. v. Brock, 75 Cal. App.2d 
173, 170 P.2d 508 (1946) cf. Grand 
v. Griesinger, 160 Cal. App.2d 307, 
325 P.2d 475 (1958). If, however, the 
license has expired, absent a statute 
to the contrary, an agency may not 
institute proceedings against the former 
licensee. O'Neil v. Department of 
Professional & Vocational Standards, 
7 Cal. App.2d 395, 46 P.2d 234 (1935). 
S. 266 Cal. App.2d 697, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 449 (1968). 
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claim, once this determination was made, the role of the staff 
of the Board of Control was only ministerial, i.e., to see to the 
drawing of the funds and transmittal of them to the claim-
ant. The act of the zealous employee, in seeking to hold the 
legislative appropriation for ransom until the applicant signed 
the general release, was said by the Court to be without au-
thority. The release was an unlawful condition to payment. 
It was of no effect and its existence provided no defense to 
the mandamus proceeding brought by the petitioner. 
3. Exercise of Jurisdiction Without a Hearing 
The courts also had before them the question of what types 
of hearings an administrative agency could be required to give. 
In Orr v. Superior Court,6 the State Supreme Court reviewed 
the provisions of the Financial Responsibility Law7 contained 
in the Vehicle Code, and determined that where a driver was 
involved in an accident, before he would be required to show 
ability to respond in damages as a condition of retaining his 
driving privileges, the Department of Motor Vehicles would 
have to review the material before it to determine whether 
there was a reasonable possibility that a judgment might be 
recovered against the driver. The Court indicated that the 
determination of the department could be made from accident 
reports that the drivers are obligated to make pursuant to 
Vehicle Code section 16000, and from other evidence sub-
mitted to the department. This did not require the depart-
ment to hold a hearing and the department, in making its 
determination, was not required to decide whether the driver 
was at fault; rather, it was to make a determination whether 
there was any credible evidence under which the driver could 
reasonably be considered culpable. 
An administrative proceeding that results in a municipal 
employee being suspended from his employment without 
a prior hearing was upheld in Aposto!i v. City and County 
of San Francisco. 8 In Aposto/i, the applicable provisions 
6. 71 Cal.2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 816, 8. 268 Cal. App.2d 728, 74 Cal. 
454 P .2d 712 (1969). Rptr. 435 (1969). 
7. Vehicle Code §§ 16000 et seq. 
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provided for a full hearing on appeal to a higher commission, 
with right to a public trial and power to secure the attendance 
of witnesses. While a fair hearing implies adequacy of notice, 
the Court also determined that where the petitioner (1) had 
received information from his order of discharge that action 
was being taken against him and (2) had been given a copy 
of the investigation report making him fully aware of the rea-
sons for his suspension, he could not successfully contend that 
he did not have adequate notice, or that the order of discharge 
was defective in omitting the section of the agency's regula-
tion that it was charged he violated. 
4. To Reverse Former Decisions 
In Eastham v. Santa Clara Elementary School District,9 the 
Court had before it the question of whether an administrative 
agency, having once acted, has authority to reverse its prior 
determination. In Eastham, a school district had determined 
the starting salary for employees of the school district, estab-
lishing a kind of parity among certain classes of employees. 
Later, the district changed its salary policy. The contention 
was made that where the board had once adopted this policy, 
it could not change it. The claim was made that the board 
had exhausted its power over the subject matter, and had no 
further continuing jurisdiction. The Court determined that 
the fact that the district had for some time established the 
same salary schedule for nurses and teachers did not mean 
that it was arbitrary and unreasonable to change that policy. 
The Court discerned differences between teachers and nurses, 
and further found evidence to support the board's determina-
tion that different levels of competitive salary had evolved for 
the two positions. The Court, rather than being bound by 
the theory that there had been a prior decision that the board 
was powerless to change because it had exhausted its jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter, relied instead on the idea that 
there was nothing that compelled the district to treat nurses 
and teachers the same forever. The board has the power to 
9. 270 Cal. App.2d 807. 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 198 (1969). 
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change its salary policy and to classify its employees, even 
those with tenure, differently, according to training, experi-
ence, and duties. 
C. Burden of Proof 
While, generally, it may be assumed that where an adminis-
trative agency seeks to discipline an existing licensee, the 
burden of proof is on the administrative agency,10 there are 
cases where this may not be true. Among these is the case 
where a taxpayer attacks an assessment made on his property 
by an assessor. In proceedings before the local adminis-
trative agency, the taxpayer has the burden of showing that 
the assessor's figures are improper. In Griffith v. County of 
Los Angeles,ll the Court held that it was presumed that the 
assessor's actions were proper, and the taxpayer had the 
burden. 
D. Application of the Administrative Procedure Act 
In Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Cal Law-Trends and 
Developments 1969, p. 337, it was noted that a person who 
conducts an administrative hearing need be a lawyer only 
if the law requires it. Serenko v. Bright12 held that in formal 
hearings before the Department of Motor Vehicles, the 
referees conducting the proceedings for the department need 
not be persons possessing the same qualifications as those re-
quired of hearing officers conducting proceedings normally 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 13 During 1969, this 
point was reaffirmed in several cases.14 
10. Val Strough Chevrolet v. Bright, 
269 Cal. App.2d 855, 75 Cal. Rptr. 
363 (1969). 
11. 267 Cal. App.2d 837, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 773 (1969). 
12. 263 Cal. App.2d 682, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 1 (1969). 
13. Govt. Code §§ 11500 et seq. 
See also Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW, Cal Law-Trends and Develop-
ments 1969, p. 337. 
240 
14. See the cases Lacy v. Orr, 276 
Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. Rptr. 276 
(1969); Walker v. Department of 
Motor Vehicles, 274 Cal. App.2d -, 
79 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1969); Noll v. De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, 274 Cal. 
App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1969); 
Reirdon v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles, 266 Cal. App.2d 808, 76 
Cal. Rptr. 269 (1969). 
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It was argued in Department of Motor Vehicles v. Superior 
Court/5 that section 14107 of the Vehicle Code, merely in-
dicates who is to conduct a formal hearing, not who is to 
preside. The Court rejected this contention. The Court 
determined that section 14107 indicates that the hearing may 
be conducted by a referee appointed from officers or employees 
of the department. If it is borne in mind that a referee is one 
who is appointed to take testimony, hear the parties, and re-
port findings, section 14107 could hardly be used to support 
the contention that there was a distinction between conduct-
ing and presiding over hearings. The provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act will govern the actions of an 
administrative agency only to the extent that the law relating 
to that particular function of the agency makes the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act applicable. Where the sections dealing 
with the particular function of the agency carve out some 
other pattern or rule, to that extent, the Administrative Proce-
dure Act does not apply.16 
E. Res Judicata 
In Petry v. Board of Retirement/7 the Court held that a 
decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board to 
the effect that an injury arose out of and occurred in the course 
of employment, was not res judicata in proceedings before 
the Retirement Board of the County of Los Angeles. The 
Court reasoned that the retirement board had valid and in-
dependent rights with respect to determining whether the em-
ployee had suffered injury in the course and scope of his em-
ployment. ls Whatever the validity of this contention, the result 
seems inconsistent with that reached in Pathe v. City of 
15. 271 Cal. App.2d 770, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 804 (1969). 
16. See also Hough v. McCarthy, 
54 Ca1.2d 273, 5 Cal. Rptr. 668, 353 
P.2d 276 (1960); Fankhauser v. Orr, 
268 Cal. App.2d 418, 74 Cal. Rptr. 61 
(1968) and August v. Department of 
Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal. App.2d 52, 
70 Cal. Rptr 172 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1970 
17. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 77 Cal. 
Rptr. 891 (1969). 
18. The court relied upon Flaherty 
v. Board of Retirement, 198 Cal. App. 
2d 397, 18 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1961) and 
Grant v. Board of Retirement, 253 Cal. 
App.2d 1020, 61 Cal. Rptr 791 (1967). 
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Bakersfield/9 which held that a decision of the Industrial Ac-
cident Commission was binding upon a local pension board.20 
It seems odd to indicate that a pension board such as the one 
in Pathe does not have the same rights and responsibilities 
as the retirement board in Petry. 
F. Quasi-Legislative Hearings 
In California Grape etc. League v. Industrial Welfare Com-
mission, 1 the Court had before it the question concerning the 
kind of hearing required when an agency is adopting rules and 
regulations. The Court determined that proceedings for the 
adoption of rules are quasi-legislative in character, and a 
hearing of a judicial type is not required. 2 The commission 
was not required to make specific proposals before or at pub-
lic hearings, so that those persons at the hearing who were, 
perhaps, at odds with the ultimate determination of the com-
mission, were not entitled to have notice or information as to 
what specific proposals might be proposed. The statute did 
not require such proposals. 3 The commission did not err in 
failing to make available at hearings experts and staff of the 
commission who had prepared and compiled statistical studies, 
surveys, and other data considered by the commission, or to 
place in evidence and allow cross-examination with respect to 
any of the studies, surveys, and data. Apparently, the conten-
19. 255 Cal. App.2d 409, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 220 (1967). 
20. See French v. Rissel, 40 Cal.2d 
477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953); Gale v. State 
Board of Equalization, 264 Cal. App. 
2d 689, 70 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1968) and 
Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Cal Law 
-Trends and Developments 1969, p. 
321. 
1. 268 Cal. App.2d 692, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 313 (1969). For further discus-
sion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, in this volume. 
2. The court followed Rivera v. 
Division of Industrial Welfare, 265 
Cal. App.2d 576, 71 Cal. Rptr. 739 
(1968). See also Manuel, ADMIN IS-
242 
TRATIVE LAW, Cal Law-Trends and 
Developments 1969, p. 315. 
3. The court noted the provisions of 
Government Code § 11425 relating to 
the requirements for quasi-legislative 
exercise of power and providing that 
on the date and at the time designated 
in the notice the state agency shall 
afford any interested person or his duly 
authorized representative or both an 
opportunity to present statements, 
arguments, or contentions in writing, 
with or without opportunity to present 
the same orally. Impliedly, the deci-
sion determined that § 11425 did not 
require anything approaching a quasi-
judicial hearing. 
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tion had been made that various studies should have been in-
troduced and subject to attack and that the people who pre-
pared them should have been subject to cross-examination.4 
IV. Judicial Review 
A. Limitation on Court Review 
Cases decided in 1969 have again emphasized some limits 
on the jurisdiction of courts to review acts of administrative 
agencIes. 
1. Legislative Limitations 
a. Alcoholic Beverage Control Review 
An example of legislative limitations placed on court review 
of decisions of administrative agencies is noticeable in the field 
of alcoholic beverage control. In order to overcome the in-
ordinate amount of time it takes to have decisions of the De-
partment of Alcoholic Beverage Control become final, the 
legislature, in 1967, adopted a more speedy procedure.5 His-
tory had indicated that while it took some time for the Al-
coholic Beverage Control Appeals Board to decide cases, there 
were some unexplainable delays occurring in the Superior 
Courts.s The legislature decided to eliminate the Superior 
Court from the review process, and, in 1967, enacted section 
23090.5 of the Business and Professions Code providing: 
4. See Ray v. Parker 15 Cal.2d 275, 
101 P.2d 665 (1940) and Olive Prora-
tion etc. Committee v. Agriculture etc. 
Committee, 17 Cal.2d 204, 109 P.2d 
918 (1941). The court indicated that 
statutes involved in those cases may 
have imposed more rigid standards and 
requirements than those found in 
§ 11425 of the Government Code and 
the applicable Labor Code provisions. 
Accordingly, cases that seemed to in-
dicate that there are more stringent 
requirements for quasi-legislative hear-
ings should be considered in light of 
CAL LAW 1970 
the statutes involved. Otherwise, the 
courts may adopt the attitude, as did 
the court in the instant case, that they 
have no authoritative bearing on re-
view of quasi-legislative type hearings. 
5. Stats. 1967, Ch. 1525, amending 
Business and Professions Code §§ 
23090 et seq. 
6. Report on Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act, Assembly Interim Com-
mittee on Governmental Organization, 
1961-1963, Volume 12, No.7 (Jan-
uary 1963), pp. 7-11. 
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No court of this state except the Supreme Court and 
the courts of appeal to the extent specified in this article 
shall have jurisdiction to review, affirm, reverse, correct, 
or annul any order, rule or decision of the department or 
to suspend, stay or delay the operation or execution there-
of or to restrain, enjoin or interfere with the department 
in the performance of its duties, but a writ of mandate 
shall lie from the Supreme Court or the courts of appeal 
in any proper case. 
In Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Superior 
Courf and Kirby v. Superior Court and Gil Mar Club, Inc} 
the Court of Appeals ruled that the Superior Court lacked ju-
risdiction to review a decision of the Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control in a proceeding instituted after the effective 
date of the changes divesting the Superior Court of such juris-
diction. 
In the first of these cases,9 the Court of Appeals noted the 
similarity of sections of the Business and Professions Code1o 
to sections of the Labor Code,11 relating to judicial review of 
decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. 
These sections provide that review must be sought in the re-
viewing court within 30 days after the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Appeals Board filed its final order. Since the peti-
tioners failed to seek review within the time specified, the 
Court held that the decision of the department must stand, 
and, by virtue of Business and Professions Code section 
23090.5, that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to 
entertain or to stay the enforcement of the suspension order, 
regardless of the merits. The procedure now provided for by 
Business and Professions Code section 23090.5 contemplates 
that decisions of the department or of the Alcoholic Beverage 
7. 268 Cal. App.2d 67, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
780 (1968). 
8. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
381 (1969); see also Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Superior 
Court, 268 Cal. App.2d 7, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 671 (1968). 
244 
9. 268 Cal. App.2d 67, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
780 (1968). 
10. Bus. and Prof. Code, §§ 23089 
and 23090. 
11. Lab. Code §§ 5810 and 5950. 
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Control Appeals Board will be reviewed pursuant to writs of 
review. 
It had been contended that the 1967 amendment to the 
Business and Professions Code12 unconstitutionally divested 
the Superior Courts of jurisdiction granted to them by the 
state Constitution.13 These decisions upheld the power of the 
legislature to limit review to the courts named in the act, and 
held that the Superior Courts could be constitutionally di-
vested of jurisdiction. There was no undue impairment of the 
rights of the aggrieved party to obtain judicial relief, because 
the Superior Court really had exercised no greater power than 
the reviewing court. Since all the courts in the chain of review 
can use only the substantial evidence rule to determine if the 
findings of the department are supported by the evidence, the 
petitioner lost no real right. 
The 1967 amendment took effect on November 8, 1967, 
and it made no difference when the acts of the petitioners were 
alleged to have happened; the decisive time was when the Al-
coholic Beverage Control Appeals Board filed its final deci-
sion. It was at this time that the right to judicial review 
matured. The amendments then in effect governed the mat-
ter. 
In spite of this case, some Superior Courts were unwilling 
to deny jurisdiction. In the second case, Kirby v. Superior 
Court and Gil Mar Club, Inc./4 the Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control, through its director, was forced to seek a 
petition for writ of prohibition. Based on the prior case, the 
Court of Appeals had no difficulty sustaining the position of 
12. Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 23090 
et seq. 
13. California Constitution, Article 
VI, § 10 reads as follows: 
The Supreme Court, courts of ap-
peal, superior courts, and their judges 
have original jurisdiction in habeas 
corpus proceedings. Those courts also 
have original jurisdiction in proceed-
ings for extraordinary relief in the 
nature of mandamus, certiorari, and 
prohibition. 
CAL LAW 1970 
Superior courts have original juris-
diction in all causes except those given 
by statute to other trial courts. 
The Court may make such comment 
on the evidence and the testimony and 
credibility of any witness as in the 
opInIOn is necessary for the proper 
determination of the cause. (Added 
Nov. 8, 1966.) 
14. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal 
Rptr. 381 (1969). 
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the department and reaffirmed the constitutionality of section 
23090.5; the state Supreme Court denied hearing. 
b. Public Utilities Commission Review 
Another limitation on the Superior Courts that prohibits in-
terference with decisions of administrative agencies is seen in 
Hickey v. Roby.15 The Superior Court set aside a permanent 
injunction that purported to enjoin a water company and some 
of its officers from transferring, cancelling, or reversing stock 
ownership on the water company's books without consent of 
the appellant. The Public Utilities Commission intervened in 
the Superior Court action and moved to set aside the injunc-
tion, contending, among other things, that there were out-
standing final decisions of the Public Utilities Commission 
that bore on the question of whether the injunction should 
have issued. The implied finding of the trial court was that 
the injunction would have interfered with the commission in 
the performance of its duties in contravention of Public Util-
ities Code section 1759. The Court of Appeals held that each 
of the decisions of the commission relied on was a final order 
at the time of the Superior Court action, and was thus con-
clusive and binding upon the parties. No order of the com-
mission is subject to review in any court of the state except the 
state Supreme Court, and even if an order of the commission 
is palpably erroneous in law, it is binding and conclusive on 
all courts of the state until annulled by the state Supreme 
Court.16 If the commission acts after the Superior Court has 
assumed jurisdiction to determine the rights of parties, a later 
decision by the commission, made within its jurisdiction, will 
have the effect of superseding any prior judgment of the Su-
perior Court. In Hickey, the Superior Court had no jurisdic-
tion, by virtue of the Public Utilities Code,17 to issue the in-
junction. It was contended by the appellant that by 
intervening, the commission had estopped itself to deny juris-
diction of the Superior Court. However, the Court of Appeals 
15. 273 Cal. App.2d -, - Cal 16. See, for instance Pub. UtiI. Code 
Rptr. - (1969). § 1759. 
17. Pub. UtiI. Code § 1759. 
246 CAL LAW 1970 24
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/9
Administrative Law 
found this contention had no merit. Although the appellant 
was not a party before the Public Utilities Commission in the 
decision that had then become final, this fact still did not em-
power the Superior Court to negate a decision of the commis-
sion made within the commission's jurisdiction. The appel-
lant's remedy was to appeal to the commission, not the 
Superior Court. 
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Among the limitations on Superior Court jurisdiction estab-
lished by case law is the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. In Noonan v. Green/8 the Court reaffirmed the 
vitality of the doctrine, which provides that where an adminis-
trative remedy is available, a party seeking judicial review 
must first exhaust that remedy. 
. Where in an administrative proceeding there 
is an administrative appellate body provided by statute, 
that body must exercise its jurisdiction before the courts 
may be called upon to act, and the parties to an adminis-
trative proceeding may not waive the benefits of the 
statute established for public reasons, nor may jurisdic-
tion be conferred upon a court by consenes 
Thus, the Court recognized that exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies goes to the very jurisdiction of the court, and 
until the remedies are exhausted, a court can have no juris-
diction over the subject matter. 20 
In Reimel v. House/ the decision of the Court notes that 
18. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 513 (1969). 
19. 276 Cal. App.2d -, -, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 513, 517. 
20. Abelleira v. District Court of 
Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 109 P.2d 942, 
132 A.L.R. 715 (1941). Thus, it was 
error for the superior court to assume 
jurisdiction in a controversy between a 
school district and pupil concerning the 
suspension of the pupil for refusing to 
wear the uniform prescribed by the 
CAL LAW 1970 
school where there was an administra-
tive remedy available to review the sus-
pension. The doctrine was held ap-
plicable even in the face of the con-
tention by the appellant that the re-
quirement that she wear a certain uni-
form was unconstitutional. United 
States v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.2d 
189, 120 P.2d 26 (1941); Walker v. 
Munro, 178 Cal. App.2d 67, 2 Cal. 
Rptr. 737 (1960). 
1. 268 Cal. App.2d 780, 74 Cal. 
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while on review a licensee objected to the use of a deposition. 
At the time of the hearing before the administrative agency, 
the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, no objection 
was made on any ground urged on appeal. The Court stated 
that an issue not raised before the trier of fact could not ordi-
narily be raised for the first time on appellate review, and this 
meant that it could not be raised for the first time before 
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board. Moreover, 
the Court noted that decisions of the department could not be 
defeated for mere error unless the reviewing tribunal, after 
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, should 
be of the opinion that the error complained of had resulted in 
a miscarriage of justice.2 
C. Non-reviewable Administrative Action 
In Jones v. Oxnard School District,3 Sadie Jones applied for 
employment with the Oxnard School District. The school 
district and State Board of Education denied her application. 
On appeal, a dismissal, after a general demurrer to the com-
plaint, was affirmed. 
The amended complaint before the reviewing court alleged 
that the appellant was a qualified elementary school teacher 
and the holder of a general elementary teaching credential. 
She had registered her credential with the particular county 
superintendent of schools and applied for a teaching position 
in the Oxnard School District. She further alleged that the 
district employed a number of elementary school teachers who 
were not duly certificated and that such employment was in 
violation of the law, which provides for the hiring of non-
certificated teachers only on applications accompanied by a 
statement of need indicating that there are no qualified reg-
ularly certificated applicants for the positions available. The 
Rptr. 345 (1969). See Manuel, AD- 3. 270 Cal. App.2d 587, 75 Cal. 
MINISTRATIVE LAW, Cal Law-Trends Rptr. 836 (1969). For further discus-
and Developments 1969, pp. 316, 342. sion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTI-
2. California Constitution, Article TUTIONAL LAW, in this volume. 
VI, § 13. See also Ward v. County 
of Riverside, 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 
Cal. Rptr. 46 (1969). 
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Court determined that the appellant's argument called for ju-
dicial review of a nonreviewable administrative action. 
The appellant did not attack the propriety of the action of 
the State Board of Education in issuing the provisional creden-
tials that permitted other persons to be employed in the posi-
tion sought by her. She had elected not to make the state 
board a party to the action. Her attack was directed against 
the action of the local district that led to the ultimate decision 
of the state board. 
The Court noted that the attack that she made could suc-
ceed only if she alleged either that the district refused to ex-
ercise its discretion or that it failed to act as enjoined by law, 
but that neither situation was present in the case. Since tra-
ditional mandate under Civil Procedure Code section 1085 
was inapplicable, the Court reasoned that administrative man-
damus under Civil Procedure Code section 1094.5 was not 
applicable. The action of filing the certificate of need was 
not within the definition of a quasi-judicial activity so as to 
be within the ambit of the latter section. It simply was a pre-
liminary step by one body enabling another to act. The Court 
stated that since no vested procedural or substantive right of 
the appellant's employment was involved, due process did not 
require a method of judicial review to be formulated where 
none was provided by the statute. 
In Worthington v. State Board of Control,4 the court held 
that the role of the State Board of Control in drawing and 
transmitting funds appropriated by the legislature to compen-
sate private citizens for personal injury incurred while trying 
to prevent a crime is only a ministerial act. The board, at its 
discretion, may compensate such injured persons. The Court 
indicated that the statute5 involved merely created a procedure 
through which claims for indemnity could be received and 
evaluated by the board of control. Under the statute, the 
board then makes recommendations to the legislature for ap-
propriation. If a claimant is not satisfied with the board of 
control's compensation recommendation, his remedy is to ap-
4. 266 Cal. App.2d 697, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 449 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1970 
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proach his legislative representative and seek hearings before 
the appropriate subcommittee of the Assembly Ways and 
Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee. In turn, 
the legislature is free to reduce, increase, or totally reject the 
board's recommendations. The board of control acts only 
in an advisory capacity, and any dissatisfaction with the 
procedures followed by the board, the rules adopted by 
it, or the advice it gives to the legislature, must be pursued 
through exclusively legislative means. There is no judicial 
review. 
Another example of nonreviewable administrative action 
stems from the general rule that where an officer is vested with 
discretionary power, a court cannot control this discretion. 
Accordingly, mandamus will not lie to compel the district at-
torney to prosecute a charge of perjury where his duties in 
this respect are discretionary and not mandatory. This was 
the holding in Ascherman v. Bales,6 although Government 
Code section 26501 provided that the district attorney shall 
institute proceedings before magistrates for the arrest of per-
sons charged with or reasonably suspected of public offenses, 
when he has information that such offenses have been com-
mitted. Although the statute uses the word "shall," the con-
text of the word in the statute indicates that the duty contem-
plated by the legislature was discretionary. 
Although mandamus will not lie to control discretion, it 
was held in Priest v. Housing Authoriti that where the ex-
ercise of discretion necessarily involves the interpretation of 
a statute, courts could entertain the action to determine if 
the interpretation of the statute was correct. In Priest, the 
trial court found that mandamus could not be used to control 
a discretionary act, and that the respondent therein had ex-
ercised its discretionary power in deciding that a contract did 
not come within the purview of a statute involved. The re-
viewing court, on the other hand, took the position that inter-
pretation or construction of a statute is a matter of law, not 
the exercise of discretionary authority, and that mandamus 
6. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 7. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. 
445 (1969). Rptr. 145 (1969). 
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was a proper remedy to correct a misinterpretation of a stat-
ute.s 
D. Standing To Institute Proceedings 
The question of who may bring an action to review an 
administrative action was touched on in California School Em-
ployees Association v. Sequoia etc. School District,9 holding 
that the association had standing to sue in its own name to en-
force the employment rights of its members. The issue before 
the Court was whether a food service program, by which a 
nongovernmental concern was granted a concession to provide 
vending machines, violated the rights of school cafeteria em-
ployees. The concession agreement resulted in the termina-
tion of their employment. The Court held that the association 
had a justifiable public interest in the case. 
The Court also recognized that the association had such a 
stake in the outcome as to assure the kind of adverseness that 
would sharpen the issues.1o 
InAmerican Federation of Teachers, Local 1713, AFL-
8. Likewise, in Proctor v. San 
Francisco Port Authority, 266 Cal. 
App.2d 675, 72 Cal Rptr. 248 (1968), 
the adoption by the Port Authority of 
salary ranges for its employees in 
excess of the powers granted to it by 
the Harbors and Navigation Code, 
could be reviewed by the court and 
declared invalid, and once the court 
declared the new salary ranges invalid, 
the court could order payment to the 
employees under salary ranges that 
existed prior to the adoption of the 
void range. However, in Lawe v. 
EI Monte School District of Los 
Angeles, 267 Cal. App.2d 20, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 554 (1968), it will be noted that 
where the governing board of a school 
district has the power to fix and order 
compensation, the court will accord to 
the board a great deal of leeway and 
respect, leaving it to the governing 
CAL LAW 1970 
board, for example, to determine the 
extent to which it will give credit for 
teaching experience outside the district. 
The court will not interfere with its 
determination in this respect if the 
policy is reasonable in nature, fairly 
applied without discrimination. 
9. 272 Cal. App.2d 98, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
187 (1969). 
10. Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. 
v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.2d 276, 
32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 (1963); 
International Association of Fire 
Fighters v. City of Palo Alto, 60 Cal.2d 
295, 32 Cal. Rptr. 842, 384 P.2d 170 
(1963) . The court having determined 
that the association had standing, it was 
not necessary to determine whether the 
association had an alternative right to 
maintain the action, as a taxpayers' 
suit to enjoin an illegal expenditure. 
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CIO v. San Leandro Unified School District,ll the American 
Federation of Teachers was held to have had no standing to 
seek a writ of mandate directing the school district to employ 
a probationary teacher. The decision not to employ the pro-
bationary teacher was arrived at after a hearing held pursuant 
to the Administrative Procedure Act.12 All that was involved 
were the rights of the employee. Since no interest or right of 
the union was invaded, no relief could be granted to the union. 
The union was not a proper party and could not state a cause 
of action.13 While the reasons given in the case appear to be 
valid, it should be noted that traditionally where there has 
been an administrative hearing of an adjudicatory nature, 
standing to seek judicial review has been limited to those per-
sons who were parties before the administrative agency.14 
E. Other Equitable Considerations 
The equitable nature of mandamus was amplified in Genser 
v. McElvy/5 wherein the petitioner sought to compel the state 
architect to revoke his approval of a change order providing 
for the substitution of plastic pipe for metal pipe. However, 
the Court noted that this proceeding was really moot, and 
mandamus would not lie where the plastic pipe had been in-
stalled and encased in the walls and floors before a school 
district was joined as an indispensable party. The Court 
noted that although mandamus is generally classed as a legal 
remedy, the question of whether it should be applied is con-
trolled by equitable considerations. 
11. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. of Merced, 204 Cal. App.2d 387, 22 
Rptr. 758 (1969). Cal. Rptr. 270 (1962) were inapplica-
12. Govt. Code §§ 11500 et seq. ble. 
13. Hence, the court held that cases 14. Madruga v. Borden, 63 Cal. 
such as International Association of App.2d 116, 146 P.2d 273 (1944); 2 
Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto, 60 Cal. Jur.2d ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Cal.2d 295, 32 Cal. Rptr. 842, 384 § 209, p. 343. 
P.2d 170 (1963) and International As- 15. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 82 Cal. 
sociation of Fire Fighters v. County Rptr. 420, 82 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1969). 
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V. Scope of Review 
A. In General 
Traditionally, adjudicatory decisions of local and state-wide 
agencies given adjudicatory powers by the state constitution 
are reviewed by the substantial evidence rule.16 
B. Constitutionally Created Agencies 
In County of Los Angeles v. Tax Appeals Board No.2 for 
the County of Los Angeles, 17 the Court, discussing the appli-
cability of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, asked the 
question whether an agency exercises an adjudicatory func-
tion in considering facts presented at a hearing. The Court 
noted that where a party has a beneficial interest in the sub-
ject matter of the administrative proceedings, and has the 
right to appear, he may properly institute proceedings for 
mandamus. One of the universally recognized results of the 
substantial evidence rule, where mandamus is sought to review 
the decision of a local agency, is that the court has no power 
to conduct a trial de novo and substitute its findings on matters 
within the jurisdiction of the local board. In the instant case, 
the board was created under the authority of California Con-
stitution, Article XIII, section 9.5. The Court concluded that 
where there was no evidence to support the findings of the ad-
ministrative agency, the action of the agency could not stand, 
and the Superior Court acted properly in remanding the pro-
ceedings to the board and commanding the board to set aside 
its decision and to conduct further hearings. 
In Petry v. Board of Retirement of the Los Angeles County 
Employees Retirement Association,18 the Court again dealt 
with a local agency and determined that in reviewing a board 
decision neither the Superior Court nor a reviewing court 
could reweigh the evidence. A reviewing court, in applying 
16. Some of the more fundamental 17. 267 Cal. App.2d 830, 73 Cal. 
notions in this regard were commented Rptr. 469 (1968). 
upon in Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. 18. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 77 Cal. 
Cal Law-Trends and Developments Rptr. 891 (1969). 
1969, p. 310. 
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the substantial evidence rule when reviewing a decision of a 
local agency, applies the same standard as is applicable to a 
review of trial court findings. That is, all conflicts in the evi-
dence must be resolved in favor of the, decision, and all rea-
sonable inferences will be applied in support of the decision. 
So well-established is the rule and so easy is itto understand, 
that one is amazed that the trial courts are still having prob-
lems. In Upton v. Gray/9 the trial court, in dealing with a 
decision of a local administrative agency, accepted new evi-
dence on and decided anew, an issue previously decided by 
the agency. This action on the part of the trial court was 
held error by the Court of Appeals. When the subject und~r 
review is a decision of a local or county administrative agency 
that by law is required to hold a hearing, the power of the court 
is strictly limited, and it may not exercise its independent judg-
ment or allow a trial de novo on fact issues formally before the 
agency. The Court noted that review is limited to a determi-
nation of whether the agency, based on the evidence before it, 
abused its discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious man-
ner. The Superior Court cannot reweigh the evidence. While 
the reviewing court dwelt on the nature of the agency in de-
termining that the trial court acted improperly in accepting 
new evidence, it followed a line of cases previously decided.20 
The Court might have simply resolved this issue on the basis 
of subdivision (e) of the Code of Civil Procedure section 
1094.5. Barkin v. Board of Optometry/ establishes that the 
limitations therein provided are applicable whether the sub-
stantial evidence rule is followed or the court is given the right 
to conduct a so-called limited trial de novo under the Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1094.5.2 
19. 269 Cal. App.2d 352, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 783 (1969). 
20. For example, Beverly HiIIs Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association v. 
Superior Court, 259 Cal. App.2d 306, 
66 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1968). 
1. 269 Cal. App.2d 714, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 337 (1969). 
254 
2. Other cases decided reaffirming 
that the scope of review with respect 
to local agencies is the substantial evi-
dence rule, are: Apostoli v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 268 Cal. 
App.2d 728, 74 Cal. Rptr 435 (1969); 
Griffith v. County of Los Angeles, 267 
Cal. App.2d 837, 73 Cal. Rptr 773 
(1968), cert. den., 395 U.S. 945, 23 L. 
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In Ishimatsu v. Board of Regents,S the Court determined 
that mandamus was proper to obtain review of a University of 
California decision to terminate a librarian's employment (1) 
where a hearing was granted (2) evidence was taken and (3) 
determinations of fact were vested in the hearing agency. The 
Court held that under the state Constitution the university is 
a statewide administrative agency possessing adjudicatory 
powers. The employee had contended that the Constitution 
did not delegate to the university the power to make such an 
adjudicatory determination of facts. The reviewing Court 
answered that the university was a statewide administrative 
agency with powers derived from Article IX, section 9, of the 
state Constitution, possessed of full powers of organization 
and government, and subject only to such legislative control 
as may be necessary to insure compliance with the terms of 
endowments of the university and the security of its funds. 
The Court interpreted Article IX, section 9 of the Constitution 
as granting to the university adjudicatory powers with respect 
to problems relating to its personnel. The employee at-
tempted to attack the evidence presented, charging it was not 
credible or competent. The Court indicated that there may 
have been conflicts in the evidence but that these conflicts 
were resolved against the employee. Strangely, although the 
Court was dealing with what it determined was a constitu-
tional agency, the Court sought refuge in cases standing for 
the proposition that where the trial court makes an independ-
ent determination on the facts, the reviewing court is bound 
by the decision of the trial court, if there is any evidence to 
Ed. 463, - S.Ct. -. Griffith indicates 
again that the taxpayer must challenge 
the determination of the value of his 
property for tax purposes, show the 
local board that the assessor's figures 
are improper and that the assessments 
are not fair or equitable. To sustain 
his burden, the taxpayer must introduce 
some evidence of the assessor's inequity 
before any burden is cast on the as-
sessor. Before the administrative 
agency, the assessor can stand on the 
CAL LAW 1970 
presumption that his assessment is fair 
and equitable. Thus, the taxpayer 
must bear in mind, before he seeks 
mandamus to review the actions of 
the board denying his request for re-
assessment, that his failure to make 
out a prima facie case will make the 
respondent local agency's task much 
simpler on appeal. 
3. 266 Cal. App.2d 854, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 756 (1968). 
255 
33
Manuel: Administrative Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Administrative Law 
support it.4 The use of those decisions is not consistent with 
the application of the substantial evidence test. 
The California Constitution, Article XX, section 14 re-
quires the legislature to provide for the maintenance of a State 
Board of Health. However, Alta-Dena Dairy v. County of 
San Dieg06 held that decision-making power was not granted. 
Although the local health officer has certain powers with re-
gard to control of milk, his actions as an agent of a state-
wide administrative agency could be reviewed by a trial de 
novo. 
In Gubser v. Department of Employment,6 a discharged 
state employee sought review of a decision of the State Per-
sonnel Board. That a decision of the State Personnel Board 
is reviewable under the substantial evidence rule has long since 
been established.7 Nevertheless, the trial court sought to inter-
fere with the decision of the State Personnel Board without 
giving effect to the substantial evidence rule in favor of the 
agency's decision. Gubser gives a definition of substantia] 
evidence that might be helpful. It defines "substantial evi-
dence" as "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, that is, whether 
a fair and reasonable mind would accept it as probative of the 
issue." The Court further stated: 
It matters not that we might have come to a different 
conclusion had the decision been ours to make in the first 
instance, or that reasonable men might differ, as re-
spondent argues; it is enough that a reasonable mind 
could reach the same conclusions as reached by the Ap-
peals [sic] Board. 8 
4. The court followed Moran v. 
Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal. 
2d 301, 196 P.2d 20 (1948) and Yakov 
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 
Cal.2d 67, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785, 435 
P.2d 553 (1968). 
5. 271 Cal. App.3d 66, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
510 (1969). For further discussion of 
this case, see Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, in this volume. 
256 
6. 271 Cal. App.2d 240, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 577 (1969). 
7. Shepherd v. State Personnel 
Board, 48 Cal.2d 41, 307 P.2d 4 (1957), 
and see Sweeney v. State Personnel 
Board, 245 Cal. App.2d 246, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 766 (1966). 
8. 271 Cal. App.2d 240, -, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 577, 581 (1969). 
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When facts constituting an impairment of First Amendment 
rights are uncontradicted, the question is one of law and not 
of fact, and thus the state Supreme Court may make an in-
dependent examination of the whole record to determine if 
there has been an infringement of constitutional rights. In 
Los Angeles Teachers' Union v. Los Angeles City Board of 
Education,9 the Supreme Court reversed a judgment of the 
trial court denying a writ of mandate. The lower court had 
refused to stop the local board of education from interfering 
with the right of the teachers' union to circulate a petition on 
noninstruction time. This case is not particularly startling, 
for it simply announces the test for appellate review that is 
applicable in any situation where there is a claim of violation 
of First Amendment rights where First Amendment freedoms 
have been involved. This doctrine has already been applied 
to the review of a decision of the Public Utilities Commission; 
ordinarily, the scope of review of that agency's decisions would 
be limited by the substantial evidence rule. tO 
C. Legislatively Created Agencies 
With respect to legislatively created agencies of the State of 
California, the state Supreme Court in Merrill v. Department 
of Molar Vehicles, 11 recapitulated the existing rules without 
making any new or different application of those rules. The 
Court was dealing with a decision of the Department of Motor 
Vehicles refusing an application for a motor vehicle dealer's 
license. 
The controlling statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 
1094.5,12 does not indicate in what cases the court is authorized 
9. 71 Cal.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 
455 P.2d 827 (1969). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see Leahy, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW, in this volume. 
10. Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 
Cal Law-Trends and Developments 
1969, p. 310. 
11. 71 Cal.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 89, 
458 P.2d 33 (1969). 
12. The court quotes from Code of 
CAL LAW 1970 
Civil Procedure § 1094.5(b) the follow-
ing: 
"The inquiry in such a case [i.e., 
one involving review of an administra-
tive decision by writ of mandate] shall 
extend to the questions whether the re-
spondent was [sic] proceeded without, 
or in excess of jurisdiction: whether 
there was a fair trial; and whether 
there was any prejudicial abuse of dis-
cretion. Abuse of discretion is estab-
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to exercise its independent judgment concerning the evidence. 
Such a determination, accomplished by means of judicial de-
cision, depends on whether the right or interest effected by the 
administrative decision is a vested one. If the right is vested, 
the decision is reviewed by means of a limited trial de novo in 
which the court not only examines the record for errors of 
law also, but exercises its independent judgment by weighing 
the evidence adduced at the hearing together with any other 
evidence properly admitted by the Court. The Court noted 
that in the case before it, the plaintiff was seeking a dealer's 
license. He did not have one. As a result, the Court was not 
dealing with a vested right within the meaning given that term 
by the decided cases.13 The decision indicated that where a 
statewide agency affects vested rights, the Superior Court may 
exercise its independent judgment on the weight of the evi-
dence produced before the administrative agency, together 
with any other evidence properly admitted by the Court. The 
Court had in mind Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 
(d), limiting introduction of evidence outside the record to 
that relevant evidence that in the exercise of due diligence 
could not have been produced at the administrative hearing 
or that was offered there and was erroneously excluded. In-
deed, the state Supreme Court cited section 1094.5 subdivision 
(d), and indicated that the Superior Court cannot, at will, 
admit simply any evidence it deems relevant. 
For example, in Barkin v. Board of Optometry,l4 a compre-
hensive and especially well-written opinion, the Court deter-
lished if the respondent has not pro-
ceeded in the manner required by law, 
the decision or order is not supported 
by the findings, or the findings are not 
supported by the evidence. 
(c) Where it is claimed that the find-
ings are not supported by the evidence, 
in cases in which the court is author-
ized by law to exercise its independent 
judgment on the evidence, abuse of dis-
cretion is established if the court de-
termines that the findings are not sup: 
ported by the weight of the evidence; 
and in all other cases abuse of discre-
258 
tion is established if the court deter-
mines that the findings are not support-
ed by substantial evidence in the light 
of the whole record." (Italics are the 
court's.) 
13. The court cites especially South-
ern California Jockey Club, Inc. v. Cal-
ifornia Horse Racing Board, 36 Cal.2d 
167, 223 P.2d 1, and McDonough v. 
Goodcel, 13 Cal.2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035, 
123 A.L.R. 1205 (1939). 
14. 269 Cal. App.2d 714, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 337 (1969). 
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mined that the trial court was correct in refusing to receive 
evidence. This was a mandamus proceeding to review a de-
cision of the Board of Optometry disciplining an optometrist 
licensee; a limited trial de novo could properly be held. The 
offered evidence was to the effect that the members of the 
board were prejudiced against the licensee. The petition, 
however, did not charge bias and prejudice, and made no show-
ing why such evidence could not have been made a part of 
the record at the administrative level pursuant to section 
1094.5 subdivision (d). The petitioner had the burden of 
showing either that through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence such evidence could not have been produced at the ad-
ministrative hearing, or that he attempted to produce it and 
that it was erroneously excluded. Mere speCUlation that 
neither the hearing officer nor the board would have allowed 
a showing of this kind could not excuse the petitioner's fail-
ure to offer the evidence.15 
In Orr v. Superior Court,16 the state Supreme Court evolved 
yet another test in reviewing a decision of the Department of 
Motor Vehicles that suspended a license pursuant to the Finan-
cial Responsibility Law.17 The Department of Motor Vehicles 
had contended that on a showing that a driver had been in-
volved in an automobile accident involving damages of the 
statutory level,18 the driver would have to demonstrate ability 
to respond in damages or face suspension of his license; 
whether or not the driver was at fault was not material. The 
driver claimed that due process entitled him to a complete 
hearing before the department and/or the superior court, 
where the department had to establish culpability. 
The earlier case of Escobedo v. State of California19 indi-
cated that the license might be suspended without the necessity 
of a hearing, and contained some dicta to the effect that if the 
15. Petitioner argued because of the 
provisions of Government Code § 
11512, providing that an agency mem-
ber shall not withdraw or be subject to 
disqualification if this disqualification 
would prevent the existence of a quor-
um to act in a particular case. 
CAL LAW 1970 
16. 71 Cal.2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 816, 
454 P.2d 712 (1969). 
17. Vehicle Code § 16080. 
18. Vehicle Code § 16000. 
19. 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950). 
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particular driver was not at fault his license should not be 
suspended. The court in Orr reviewed not only Escobedo, but 
cases such as Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission20 and 
Endler v. Schutzbank/ which involved essential rights and the 
necessity for a hearing. The Court concluded that before or-
dering the suspension of a license, the department must deter-
mine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment 
may be recovered against the driver, and so must consider the 
issue of culpability. However, it is not required that the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles decide as between conflicting 
versions of the accident whether the driver was in fact at fault. 
H there is any credible evidence on which he could possibly 
be considered culpable, the Court states such evidence could 
be believed by the trier of fact in a lawsuit, and will suffice to 
support a determination that it is reasonably possible that a 
judgment may be recovered against the driver. 
Justice Burke, speaking in Orr, states: 
Neither is the department called upon to make sophis-
ticated judgments upon any claim or [sic] contributory 
negligence or of last clear chance, etc., which may arise; 
such claims commonly turn in the first instance upon de-
terminations of disputed facts, and as such such determi-
nations are not the responsibility of the department. 
Even if the facts are conceded, questions of contribu-
tory negligence and of last clear chance, if at all close 
or intricate, will not serve to defeat a decision by the de-
partment that a judgment against the involved driver is 
reasonably possible . . . .2 
With respect to court review of a department order suspend-
ing a license, the driver alleging nonculpability is entitled to a 
review of the evidence submitted to the department, so that 
the court can determine whether it supports the implied find-
ing that there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment for 
damages will be rendered against the driver (and owner). 
20. 65 Cal.2d 247, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 2. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
418 P.2d 265 (1966). 816, 821,454 P.2d 712, 717 (1969). 
1. 68 Cal.2d 162, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297, 
436 P.2d 297 (1968). 
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The issue is not that indicated by the trial court in this case, 
that is, whether the driver was actually without fault. Instead, 
the issue is only whether the evidence before the department 
supports its implied finding of the reasonable possibility of 
judgment, and, accordingly, it is appropriate to limit the scope 
of review to a review of the department's action, rather than 
permit an unlimited new trial on the issue of fault. 
No cases have arisen since the decision in Orr v. Superior 
Court,3 but it is apparent that the only concern of a reviewing 
court will be whether the decision of the department is reason-
able; this is more akin to a substantial evidence case than it is 
to a limited trial de novo case. It would appear that so long 
as the determination of the department is reasonable without 
resort to working out sophisticated concepts of contributory 
negligence, last clear chance, and other doctrines, the agency 
will be upheld. Where the Superior Court can exercise its in-
dependent judgment on appeal, the reviewing court looks to 
the record to see if there is substantial evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, to support the findings and judgment 
of the Superior Court.4 If the decision is supported by sub-
stantial evidence, it will be affirmed.5 
D. Penalties Ordered by Administrative Agencies 
The reviewing courts have indicated quite clearly in both 
Imperial Termite Control, Inc. v. Structural Pest Control 
Board6 and West Romaine Corp. v. California State Board of 
Pharmacy,7 that the courts, superior as well as reviewing, are 
without power to review the extent of a penalty imposed by an 
administrative agency, as long as the penalty is within ad-
ministrative limits and there has been no abuse of discretion. 
Indeed, one reviewing court appears to have expressed im-
patience with a trial court that attempted to invade the discre-
3. 71 Ca1.2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 816, 
454 P.2d 712 (1969). 
4. Val Strough Chevrolet Co. v. 
Bright, 269 Cal. App.2d 855, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 363 (1969). 
5. See Walker v. Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles, 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 
CAL LAW 1970 
Cal. Rptr. 433 (1969) and Ianusch v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 276 Cal. 
App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1969). 
6. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
156 (1969). 
7. 266 Cal. App.2d 901, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 569 (1968). 
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tion of a board, in spite of a warning to the trial court con-
tained in an unpublished opinion in a prior appeal of the case.8 
VI. Some Constitutional Questions Incidental to Administra-
tive Law 
A. Due Process in Prior Convictions 
Under Vehicle Code section 13352, the Department of 
Motor Vehicles is required to suspend the driving privileges 
of a driver who, within a seven-year period, is twice convicted 
of drunk driving. As the result of People v. Cofjey,9 drivers 
have been asserting in the second or subsequent proceeding 
that the first conviction was void because the driver was de-
prived of his right to counsel. Consequently, there have been 
attempts by some traffic courts, in the second or subsequent 
proceeding, to declare invalid a first drunk driving conviction, 
citing Cofjey. 
In the case of Mitchell v. Orr/o a driver had suffered a for-
feiture of bail while in Florida. Later, he was brought before 
the Municipal Court in California on a subsequent charge of 
drunk driving, and there he attempted to attack the forfeiture 
of bail which took place out of the state. The Municipal 
Court, in the second drunk driving case, ruled that the prior 
forfeiture of bail was void on the basis of Cofjey. The review-
ing court held that this determination was binding on the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, and while the duty to suspend 
for a second conviction was mandatory, the department should 
have felt bound by the determination of the traffic court. A 
forfeiture of bail is deemed the equivalent of a conviction in 
California, under the Vehicle Code. It would be hard to de-
termine how Mitchell could possibly have been deprived of 
his right to counsel, as contemplated by Cofjey, where he had 
forfeited bail. There was never any contention made in 
Mitchell that the state authorities by duress, coercion, or other-
8. 266 Cal. App.2d 901, 72 Cal. 10. 268 Cal. App.2d 813, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 569 (1968). Rptr. 407 (1969). 
9. 67 Cal.2d 204, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 
430 P.2d 15 (1967). 
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wise compelled his forfeiture of bail and kept him away from 
counsel. The best that can be gleaned from the record of the 
case is that the driver was never expressly advised of his right 
to counsel and therefore People v. Coffey applied. Query: Is 
the traffic court clerk compelled to advise every motorist who 
wishes to forfeit bail of his right to counsel at the time he 
posts bail for various offenses ranging from moving violations 
to minor parking offenses? 
However, in the case of De La Vigne v. Department at Mo-
tor Vehicles,l1 the Court reaffirmed the position that the depart-
ment is bound by a subsequent determination of a traffic court 
that a prior conviction was invalid. At present, there are no 
reported cases discussing the question of what happens in the 
absence of a determination by the traffic court with respect 
to the prior conviction. Normally, the prior conviction is 
pleaded, and under Vehicle Code section 23102, if found, its 
existence is reflected in the penalty. However, there are cases 
where the prior conviction is stricken by the district attorney 
on his own motion and its validity is not then raised by the 
pleadings. The petitioner in Stenback v. Municipal Court/2 
attempted to have a pretrial determination as to the validity 
of prior convictions. The Court held that there is no such 
right, but that the convictions could be challenged at the time 
of arraignment for judgment. At that time, the court will 
have before it the Department of Motor Vehicles' record in-
volving the driver under Vehicle Code section 13209, and, 
as a part of the allocation, the driver may contest the validity 
of the prior convictions. It would appear that if the state is 
bound by a determination of the traffic court, a determination 
would also seem to be binding on the driver. On the other 
hand, where he does not raise the question of validity (1) by 
a pretrial determination (2) during trial or (3) at the allocu-
tion, it could be argued that he has waived the right to do so. 
Perhaps the driver would be barred by some concept akin to 
res judicata or collateral estoppel, if he suffers a judgment that 
assumes the validity of the prior conviction. 
11. 272 Cal. App.2d 820, 77 Cal. 12. 272 Cal. App.2d -, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 675 (1969). 917 (1969). 
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B. Economic Regulations and Due Process 
Barkin v. Board of Optometry,13 concerns economic regu-
lation in the sense that the Board of Optometry was enforcing 
regulations that forbade using an assumed name in advertis-
ing. The licensee claimed that the agency unlawfully and il-
legally discriminated against him, citing the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.14 The conten-
tion was made that other similarly operated organizations were 
allowed to so advertise and the board was making no effort 
to curtail them. The Court, however, discerned that there 
were differences between the licensee's operation and the other 
organizations, and held that these differences warranted the 
conclusion that there was a rational distinction between the 
two. The court held to be constitutional a statute that limited 
certain licentiates, particularly in the healing arts, from indica-
ting that the cost of their services were at a discount or less 
than the costs generally available in the community. The 
Court also held this statute was not an undue restriction on 
the right of free speech, although it was asserted by the li-
censee that he was disciplined for aiding unions in composing 
material that the union sent out or distributed. 
C. Free Speech 
In Los Angeles Teachers' Union v. Los Angeles City Board 
of Education/5 the Court held that First Amendment rights 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution protected em-
ployees of a school district in their circulation of a petition on 
noninstruction time. The teachers sought to circulate a peti-
tion during their duty-free lunch period. The Court observed 
that school teachers, like others, have the right to speak freely 
and effectively on public questions. The Court was seeking 
to balance the interest of a teacher as a citizen in commenting 
upon matters of public concern, and the interest of the state 
as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public serv-
13. 269 Cal. App.2d 714, 75 Cal. 15. 71 Cal.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 
Rptr. 337 (1969). 455 P.2d 827 (1969). For further dis-
14. 118 U.S. 356, 30 L.Ed. 220, 6 cussion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTI-
S.Ct. 1064 (1886). TUTIONAL LAW, in this volume. 
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ice. This case illustrates the trend toward greater recognition 
of the rights of public employees, as well as the limitation on 
administrators who would impair First Amendment freedoms 
for the purpose of curbing disharmony, inconvenience, and 
unrest. If the school district were concerned that discussion 
during the noon hour involving off-duty teachers would disturb 
other teachers engaged in planning work or engaged in other 
phases of their instructional duties, the Court said that the 
way to handle this was not to abolish speech, but to adopt 
some type of regulation prohibiting unduly raucous discus-
sions of any sort in any room where teachers are engaged in 
planning work or similar activities. 
According to Dunbar v. Governing Board of the Grossmont 
Junior College District/6 a governing board of a junior college 
district has the right to determine, control, and direct the edu-
cational program offered at the college during regular school 
hours, but such regulation is subject to limitations imposed by 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 
question arose because an organization, limited to students 
registered at the school, wished to present a debate on the 
Vietnam war between a member of the John Birch Society 
and a member of the Communist Party. The school board 
rejected the Communist speaker, apparently because he was 
a member of the Communist Party of the United States. The 
Court held the school board did not have to open the 
campus to the speakers. However, once it opened its doors, 
the board had to then observe the restrictions and limitations 
contained in the First Amendment and not discriminate 
against speakers. Apparently, as part of its educational pro-
gram, the district could be more restrictive in choosing its 
speakers than if the forum had been opened to the general 
public. The Court concluded, in this respect, that the school 
authorities could reject a speaker because of the trivial nature 
of the subject matter, or because of the speaker's lack of ex-
pertise, intelligence, or other qualifications that would bear on 
the ability to make a meaningful contribution to the educa-
16. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. sion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTI-
Rptr. 662 (1969). For further discus- TUTIONAL LAW, in this volume. 
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tional program. But, in controlling speech on campus, once 
a forum for guest speakers has been set up as part of an edu-
cational program, the district could not exercise unbridled 
censorship. 
VII. Public Employees and Administrative Law 
There have been a number of cases of special interest to 
public employees. In Almond v. County of Sacramento,17 an 
action seeking to reinstate civil service employees previously 
discharged for being absent without leave while participating 
in a strike, the Court held that public employees have no right 
to strike, and their absence could not be justified because of 
the fact that they were on strike. The local civil service com-
mission was found not to have abused its discretion in deter-
mining that the employees were absent without leave. The 
Court, in Almond, cited several cases in support of the view 
that in the absence of legislative authorization, public em-
ployees in general do not have the right to strike.1s The rule 
was settled, and the Court felt bound by it. 19 
In Gubser v. Department of Empioyment,20 the Court de-
fined the term "inexcusable neglect of duty" found in Govern-
ment Code section 19572 subdivision (d), which is one of 
several grounds for dismissal of a state employee, to mean 
"an intentional or grossfully negligent failure to exercise due 
diligence in the performance of a known official duty." Ap-
parently, the Court took the view that the expression remains 
an abstraction until viewed in the light of the facts surround-
ing a particular case. Employees in some of the field offices 
of the Department of Employment apparently grossly and 
falsely inflated the number of job placements, and the 
17. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 518 (1969). 
18. For example, see Los Angeles 
Metropolitan Transit Authority v. 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 54 
Cal.2d 684, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 355 P.2d 
905 (1960). 
19. Recent legislation found in Gov-
266 
ernment Code §§ 3500 to 3509, relat-
ing to recognition of public employees' 
organizations, did not provide a statute 
to the contrary even as amended in 
1968. 
20. 271 Cal. App.2d 240, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 577 (1969). 
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petitioner-supervisor of these employees was charged with in-
excusable neglect of duty in that he knew, or should have 
known, the reports were false. The Court stated that the 
supervisor had a duty to determine that the basic statistics on 
which the project was grounded were truthful; otherwise, there 
would have been little reason for having a supervisor at all. 
The Court deemed it futile to argue that the supervisor was 
under no duty to verify reports submitted by his subordinates, 
by even a spot check, simply because no one had ordered the 
supervisor to do so. The Court considered it to be an inherent 
duty of the supervisor to see that the reports made under his 
command were correct. 
In Ferdig v. State Personnel Board/ the state Supreme 
Court held that the State Personnel Board acted properly in 
setting aside the appointment of an employee who had been 
erroneously treated as a veteran, when in fact his service in the 
merchant marine did not qualify him for veterans' preference 
credits. Apparently, the employee had presented discharge 
papers showing service in the United States Naval Reserve, as 
distinguished from the United States Navy, to establish his 
veterans' preference. Although another record presented 
showed his service to be in wartime service in the merchant 
marine, the employing department notified the State Personnel 
Board that the employee had the necessary veterans' points to 
move him up to the No.4 position on the list. Later, a ques-
tion was raised with the department for whom the employee 
worked, and, as a result, the State Personnel Board determined 
that the veteran's points were not properly granted the em-
ployee. His appointment to a civil service position was re-
voked. The state Supreme Court in Ferdig upheld the deter-
mination by the State Personnel Board that the prior treatment 
of the employee was improper and against the law, and that 
if the employee were not a veteran, he could not continue to 
be so treated. Because the State Personnel Board has only 
those powers conferred on it by the state Constitution and 
statutes, the employee could not be given rights contrary to 
1. 71 Cal.2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 224, 
453 P.2d 728 (1969). 
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these basic laws. As a result, the State Personnel Board had 
jurisdiction to take corrective action with respect to the ap-
pointment. Although there are various grounds for discharg-
ing a state employee from civil service, the inclusion of this 
kind of mistake need not be enumerated, for it defied logic 
to say that the mere enumeration in the statute of the methods 
of separating employees from civil service where the appoint-
ment had been validly made, compels the conclusion that no 
jurisdiction exists to rectify the action of the board where the 
appointment had been made without authority. The appoint-
ment being illegal, the revocation of the appointment was 
proper, and this was so even though the probationary period 
relating to employees had run. 
In Hamm v. City of Santa Ana,2 the employee submitted his 
resignation on a form furnished by the city. An ordinance 
provided that the City Manager might permit the withdrawal 
of a resignation filed within 10 days of its effective date. The 
question was posed whether a resignation of an officer effective 
at a future date may be subsequently withdrawn prior to the 
date stated in the written resignation. The Court reviewed 
a number of cases3 and concluded that it was forced to deal 
with the method of resignation withdrawal provided by the 
2. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
102 (1969). 
3. People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26 (1855), 
wherein the state Supreme Court held 
that the tenure of an officer does not 
depend upon the will of the executive 
but on the incumbent. The court in 
Hamm commented that the author of 
the Supreme Court opinion had stated 
that he had no doubt that before the 
stated date the resignation could have 
been withdrawn. This observation was 
treated by the court of appeal as being 
obiter dicta because the resignation had 
not been so withdrawn, nor was there 
any attempt to do so. In People v. 
Marsh, 30 Cal. App. 424, 159 P. 191 
(1916), a resignation was signed and 
delivered, addressed to the board of 
supervisors, effective upon its being 
268 
filed. Six days after filing, the board 
accepted the resignation, although on 
the same day that the board met and 
before any action was taken on the 
resignation, a revocation had been 
served on each member of the board. 
The court in Marsh held that the com-
mon-law doctrine, permitting revocation 
of a resignation before acceptance had 
been abrogated by the provisions of 
law, now Government Code §§ 1750, 
1770, gave the incumbent the absolute 
right to resign without any restrictions. 
Hence, the resignation was effective 
when the revocation was not. In Meek-
er v. Reed, 70 Cal. App. 119, 232 P. 
760 (1924), the court had indicated 
that no acceptance was necessary to 
make a resignation effective. 
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legislative body, and since the employee apparently did not 
comply with the ordinance permitting a withdrawal, the resig-
nation remained effective.4 
In California State Employees Association v. Regents of the 
University of California,5 the Court determined that the pro-
visions of Government Code sections 1150 through 1157, 
dealing with salary deductions from state employees and offi-
cers for the purpose inter alia of paying dues in employee or-
ganizations, did not apply to the employees of the University 
of California. There is nothing in those statutes, the Court 
held, requiring that university employees be treated as part 
of the state government for purposes of payroll deductions. 
While for many purposes university employees are state em-
ployees,6 whether they are state employees for purposes of the 
application of any specific code section will be determined by 
looking at the statutes, with reference to the whole system of 
law of which they are a part. The Government Code had 
within its provisions special definitions interpreted so as to 
exclude the University of California from the scope of the 
legislation.7 
In Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 8 a school teacher 
had been suspended on charges that she was incompetent due 
to mental disability, the information relating to this incompe-
tency being based on stale evidence. In an earlier appeal, 
the reviewing court had held that the trial court could not base 
its decision in proceedings under the Education Code9 on such 
out-of-date expert testimony. In a retrial of the matter, the 
school district sought the appointment of a psychiatrist who 
could make a current psychiatric evaluation of the teacher. 
The trial court denied the request. The reviewing court in 
Board of Trustees held that unless it was proper to cause 
a teacher to submit to a psychiatric examination by a qualified 
4. See also French v. State Board of and Fraser v. University of California. 
Education, 265 Cal. App.2d 955, 71 39 Cal.2d 717, 249 P.2d 283 (1952). 
Cal. Rptr. 713 (1968). 7. Govt. Code §§ 1150-1157.5. 
5. 267 Cal. App.2d 667, 73 Cal. Rptr. 8. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
449 (1968). 58 (1969). 
6. For example, Tolman v. Under- 9. Ed. Code §§ 13412 and 13417. 
hill. 39 Cal.2d 708.294 P.2d 280 (1952) 
CAL LAW 1970 269 
47
Manuel: Administrative Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Administrative Law 
expert, the proceedings under Education Code section 13412, 
would be rendered useless and, thus, there was good cause to 
procure the examination. The Court not only ordered the 
Superior Court to require an examination, but, in addition, 
stated that it would not condition its peremptory writ on an 
order that a court reporter and the teacher's counsel be present 
during the psychiatric examination. Due to the atmosphere 
required by psychiatric examination, its purpose would be 
defeated by such procedures. 
VIII. Rules and Regulations 
One of the more interesting cases deciding matters of rules 
and regulations was Yeoman v. Department of Motor Vehi-
cles/o which held that a statute giving the State Board of Edu-
cation authority to adopt reasonable regulations concerning 
operation of school buses did not confer on the board author-
ity to direct the Department of Motor Vehicles to issue certifi-
cates for school buses. The discussion centered on the au-
thority of one agency of government over another. The 
agencies involved were coordinate branches of the executive 
branch of government, with the Board of Education having no 
constitutional power to assert supremacy over the Department 
of Motor Vehicles or to make regulations binding on the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles. The regulation as adopted could 
not have the effect of enlarging the grant of power under which 
the Board of Education acted. While the regulation itself 
was invalid, the legislature adopted a later measure that vali-
dated the procedure followed, and conferred on the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles the power to issue school bus licenses. 
Having enforced certain rules and regulations of the Board 
of Education, the Department of Motor Vehicles was held by 
the Court to have effectively adopted such rules without hav-
ing formally accepted the regulatory scheme. Thus, the Court 
announced that one agency's rules and regulations may be in-
formally adopted by another. The two departments decided 
10. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 CaL 
Rptr. 251 (1969). 
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upon a cooperative adjustment by which the Department of 
Motor Vehicles issues certificates based on standards partly 
of its own creation and partly the creation of the Board of 
Education. 
IX. Qualifications of Licensees 
In Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board,l1 
the Court held that a conviction for failing to report and fully 
pay federal income taxes was a conviction of a crime involving 
moral turpitude. Earlier, in the case of In re Hallinan/2 the 
state Supreme Court held that this type of conviction was not 
a crime that inherently involved moral turpitude. Subse-
quently, federal cases determined that the offense, described 
by 26 U.S.C. section 7201, involves a charge of fraud and a 
conviction thereof is based on a finding of fraud. Addi-
tionally, a host of other cases were cited to show that fraud 
was a necessary ingredient to a conviction, and, hence, moral 
turpitude is involved. 
In H. D. Wallace & Associates v. Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control/3 the Court did not have before it the ques-
tion of moral turpitude as in Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Appeals Board,14 but it did have the question of whether 
a liquor licensee might be disciplined because of a record of 
misdemeanor drunk driving. The Court took the position that 
this did not involve moral turpitude, and that it had not been 
demonstrated that there was a connection between the in-
fractions of the licensee and the conduct of the licensed busi-
ness. The Court ignored the fact, however, that the asserted 
misconduct involved the misuse of alcohol, the very com-
modity that the licensee was licensed to sell. The Court ap-
parently took the position that insobriety on and off the high-
way had no actual effect on the conduct of the licensed busi-
ness. The view of the Court seems narrow. It does not con-
cern itself with the nature of the commodity sold or the right 
11. 270 Cal. App.2d 535, 75 Cal. 13. 271 Cal. App.2d 589, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 823 (1969). Rptr. 749 (1969). 
12. 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 14. 270 Cal. App.2d 535, 75 Cal. 
(1954). Rptr. 823 (1969). 
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of the state to protect itself in advance of the apprehended 
evil. This should be contrasted with Saunders v. City of Los 
Angeles/5 where conviction of bookmaking was held to be a 
rational basis to deny renewal of a license to operate an au-
tomobile repair business. 
On the other hand, in the case of Kirby v. Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Appeals Board/6 the Court took the position that 
where the licensee was found to have employed a minor on 
his premises in violation of Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 25663, a good-faith reliance by the licensee on some evi-
dence of the employee's majority was not a defense. Business 
and Professions Code section 25660, sets forth certain statu-
tory requisites for establishing this defense, and the Court 
held that this statute must be satisfied. In order that there 
be a defense under the latter section, which also is a defense 
for serving liquor to a minor, the licensee has the dual burden 
of showing not only that he acted in good faith, free from the 
intent to violate the law, but that he exercised good faith in 
reliance on the kind of documentary evidence contemplated 
by the section. 
15. 273 Cal. App. 2d -, 78 Cal. 16. 267 Cal. App.2d 895, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 236 (1969). For further discus- Rptr. 352 (1968). 
sion of this case, see Leahy, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, in this volume. 
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